model. The multiplication of antitrust laws raises concerns that enforcement by jurisdictions with dissimilar substantive standards, procedures, and capabilities will discourage legitimate business transactions and needlessly increase the cost of controlling anticompetitive conduct.
Recognition of the problems associated with competition system multiplicity has inspired measures to promote convergence toward international norms. My presentation focuses on the development of institutions to promote consensus about the appropriate design of competition policy. I summarize trends in creating competition law regimes, identify issues involving multiplicity and extraterritoriality, and discuss one initiative, the International Competition Network (ICN), to create international institutions to promote the development and acceptance of common norms.
The Modern Development of Competition Laws
As recently as 1970, a practitioner seeking to master international competition law would have needed to study only the antitrust regimes of the United States, the European Union (EU), and several EU member states. Enforcement in other jurisdictions with competition statutes was so weak that business managers safely could ignore the laws. 
Consequences of Extraterritoriality and Multiplicity
The growth in the number of competition laws and the broad acceptance of EU and U.S. concepts of extraterritoriality have major implications for cross-border commerce. One consequence is an increase in the cost of complying with requirements for report mergers. Firms active in global commerce may be required to notify dozens of jurisdictions. This phenomenon has raised the question of whether valid competition policy goals might be achieved at lower cost through acceptance of common notification procedures.
A second consequence of multiplicity and extraterritorial application of competition laws is that the same behavior might be evaluated under divergent substantive standards. This possibility became apparent in the different outcomes achieved in the EU and the United States, respectively, in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and General Electric/Honeywell mergers.
5 Disputes between EU and U.S. antitrust agencies are rare, but they indicate the complications that companies face in determining whether a transaction will withstand antitrust scrutiny.
A third consequence involves procedural differences. In the cases cited supra in footnote 7, defendants have succeeded in invoking the FTAIA to bar the plaintiff's claims in HeereMac and United Phosphorus. Plaintiffs have withstood such challenges in Empagran and Kruman. to the U.S. courts might deter cartels by increasing their exposure for misconduct. On the other hand, inviting foreign claims might undermine the operation of U.S. and foreign leniency programs that reduce the punishment for a cartel member that is the first to inform the government about the cartel's activities.
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A fourth area of concern involves institutional capability. Many emerging market economies that recently have enacted competition laws face daunting challenges in building the institutional foundations for successful implementation. Correcting weaknesses in the relevant institutions -the competition authority and collateral bodies such as the courts -is essential if enforcement is to improve economic performance.
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Networks, Norms, and Convergence: The New Institutions of Competition Policy
The global development of competition law supplies a dramatic example of the "bottom up" development of norms. Progress toward widely-accepted norms of competition policy substantive standards, procedures, and levels of institutional capability might occur in three stages. 12 The first consists of decentralized experimentation within individual jurisdictions. The second stage involves 10 In deciding whether to use leniency measures to reduce the punishment imposed by any single competition authority, a cartel member assesses the exposure it will incur from other government authorities and other litigants (e.g., private claimants in the United States). Estimating damages potentially owed to foreign claimants suing in U.S. courts might be so uncertain that the firm declines to seek leniency, and the cartel's detection is delayed. On the use of leniency to detect cartels, see Gary R. Spratling, Detection and Deterrence: Rewarding Informants for Reporting Violations, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 798 (2001) .
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See Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 1, at 301-10 (describing common weaknesses in transition economies in institutions necessary to implement competition laws). ICN's main contribution is likely to consist of helping form an intellectual consensus about competition policy norms. The effort to accomplish this objective seems certain to alter the way competition agencies define their role and set priorities. Success in developing widely accepted international competition policy norms will require agencies to devote more resources to institution building, perhaps by taking some resources that would have been devoted to prosecuting cases.
The requirements of institution-building pose difficult choices for competition authorities.
Academics and practitioners tend to grade competition agencies by the cases they prosecute.
Generating support to commit resources to construct an effective global competition policy infrastructure requires convincing external constituencies that investments in institution building are vital to the enforcement activities that historically have been taken as the measure of competition agencies.
The internationally-driven transformation of how competition agencies will operate in the future has another important dimension. Leadership in developing competition policy norms will come to agencies that generate the best ideas. Achieving intellectual leadership demands substantial investments in "competition policy research and development." 13 Research will provide necessary means for any jurisdiction to identify superior norms and persuade others to opt in. Because progress toward widely accepted norms is likely to be gradual, only a commitment to long-run engagement will suffice. 
